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WHAT'S GOOD FOR THE GOOSE...
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF THE
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS AND SELF-
CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGES
INTRODUCTION
Privileges' play an important role in discovery and subsequent
litigation. The assertion of a privilege is the last mainstay of
confidentiality before a party to a lawsuit is faced with public
disclosure of confidential evidence. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure contain references to the role that privileges play in civil
litigation.2 Congress has also acknowledged the need for continued
development of privileges in the Federal Rules of Evidence.3
Accordingly, Congress has given federal courts flexibility to develop
privilege rules on a case-by-case basis.4
The primary justification for privileges is that if confidential
1. A privilege is "[t]hat which releases one from the performance of a duty or obligation,
or exempts one from a liability which he would otherwise be required to perform, or sustain in
common with all other persons." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 831 (6th ed. 1991). This Note will
focus primarily on the privilege as applied to documents requested for production.
2. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that "parties may obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged." FED. R- Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
3. The Federal Rules of Evidence state that "the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience." FED. R. EVID. 501
4. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (noting that "Congress manifested
an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege").
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communications or documents are subject to discovery in litigation,
this lack of complete confidentiality will negatively affect numerous
socially-useful functions and relationships.' Some professional
relationships that require complete candor and earnestness would
suffer if disclosure was compelled during litigation. To protect such
relationships that require confidentiality, courts recognize the doctor-
patient, attorney-client, and work-product privileges
Privileges create a hierarchy of rights and protect certain
confidential relationships over and above the public's evidentiary
need or "right to every man's evidence."8 While these privileges
center around individual and professional relationships, corporate and
governmental entities also benefit from the application of privileges.9
Two similar privileges protect the thought processes inherent in
internal investigations, reviews, or studies done by private businesses
and government agencies. Government agencies may assert the
deliberative process privilege, which originated in common law ° and
was later codified by Congress in the Freedom of Information Act."
Private businesses may assert a similar privilege, the self-critical
analysis privilege, 2 which is grounded solely in common law. 3 Both
5. See, e.g., id. at 45 ("The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and
counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking rpresentation .... ."). See
generally Developments in the Lm--Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450,
1471-74 (1985) [hereinafter Developments] (discussing the theories and justifications of
privilege).
6. See Developments, supra note 5, at 1472.
7. See generally id. at 1501-1629 (analyzing the development of various privileges); 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2192-2396 (1961). See also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 389 (1981) (recognizing the attorney-client privilege); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
511 (1947) (recognizing the work-product doctrine); Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1238
(N.D. Miss. 1970) (recognizing the physician-patient privilege).
8. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
2192 (1940)).
9. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (holding that the attorney-client
privilege applies in the corporate context). See generally Developments, supra note 5, at 1592-
1629 (discussing several privileges routinely asserted by various institutions).
10. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 945 (Ct. Cl.
1958).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994). For further discussion of the Freedom of Information Act, see
infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
12. The privilege is also known as the self-evaluation or the self-criticism privilege. See S.
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the deliberative process privilege and the self-critical analysis
privilege are qualified 4 and protect disclosure of non-factual
investigatory material of the deliberative process, including
evaluations, opinions, recommendations, and comments.' The
privileges represent judicial acknowledgment of the importance and
usefulness of free-flowing ideas and opinions in government agencies
and private businesses. 6
Although the so-called "twin privileges" serve similar purposes,
courts have not applied the privileges with equal weight. 7 Congress
has supported the government's deliberative process privilege and
federal courts have upheld the privilege against numerous attacks.'
However, many courts refuse to recognize the self-critical analysis
privilege in a variety of contexts and the future of the privilege is in
doubt.' 9
Kay McNab, Note, Criticizing the Self-Criticism Privilege, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 675, 679 n.27
(1987) (citng cases that have used different names for the privilege).
13. See nfra Part I.A.
14. "Qualified" pnvileges are not absolute. They may be disallowed upon a showing that
the opposing party has a strong need for disclosure or is lacking other sources for the evidence.
See, eg.. Bredice v. Doctor's Hosp., 50 F.RID. 249, 251 (D.D.C. 1970); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v.
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 327 (D.D.C. 1966).
15. See, e.g., Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 53 F.IRD. 283, 285 (N.D. Ga. 1971)
(holding that the self-critical analysis privilege applies to opinions, comments, and evaluations
made in the development of affirmative action programs); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.,
157 F. Supp. at 943 (holding that the deliberative process privilege applied to staff opinions and
recommendations of the General Services Administration).
16. See nfra notes 28-32, 34, 54, 55, 69 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Parts H.A-B.
18. For cases that have upheld the government's deliberative process privilege, see infra
note 50.
19. See, e g., University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 195 (1990) (holding that
privilege cannot be applied to peer review materials in the educational setting); Dowling v.
American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that voluntary pre-
accident safety reviews are not protected by the privilege); Wei v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D. 91, 101
(D. N.J. 1989) (rejecting privilege due to the weighty concerns of antitrust law); FTC v. TRW,
Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (rejecting the privilege in cases where the
government is seeking disclosure). For cases that have rejected the self-critical analysis
privilege in employment discrimination, see infra notes 33, 39-43 and accompanying text. See
generally James F. Flanagan, Rejecting a General Privilege for Self-Critical Analyses, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 551 (1983) (rejecting a general privilege of self-critical analysis in favor of a
case-by-case review of the competing concerns); McNab, supra note 12 (asserting that the
privilege does not further identifiable policy interests and should be abandoned).
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This Note analyzes and compares the courts' differential treatment
of the deliberative process and self-critical analysis privileges. Part I
examines the origins and development of the privileges over the past
decades.20 Part II identifies current discrepancies in courts' treatment
of the privileges by exploring the privileges as applied in several
recent employment discrimination cases.2' Part III examines the
underlying policy reasons for the differential treatment that the two
privileges have received and the apparent contradictions in the
courts' approaches. Part IV explores the need for uniformity in the
application of both privileges.22 Finally, this Note proposes that
courts should treat both privileges equally, allowing both private
businesses and government agencies to accurately predict and plan
their internal monitoring needs.
I. CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVILEGES
A. The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege
The self-critical analysis privilege protects non-factual
deliberative material, including recommendations, opinions, and
comments.' Businesses usually assert this privilege to prevent
disclosure of documents created for internal investigations, reviews,
or audits.24 Purely factual material, such as information gathered in an
20. This Note examines how federal courts have construed both privileges under the
common law. States are free to legislate their own additional set of privileges. See, e.g., NEB.
REV. STAT. § 71-2048 (1981) (creating a privilege for hospital staff meetings); N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS § 50-a (1985) (creating a privilege for police personnel records); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
146.38 (West Supp. 1982) (creating a privilege for health care evaluators).
21. To illustrate the marked contrast in the courts' treatment of the two privileges, the
employment discrimination context will be focused on in order to simplify the analysis.
Employment discrimination presents uniform policy concerns that may not exist in other
contexts.
22. In particular, the self-critical analysis privilege is in need of structured guidelines to
aid courts in its application. The deliberative process privilege, however, has extensive factors
and guidelines and probably does not need to be further clarified. See infra Part ll.B.
23. See infra note 34.
24. For an additional analysis of the roles of the attorney-client and work product
privileges in corporate internal investigations, see generally Marvin Schwartz, Preserving the
Confidentiality oflnvestigative Files, in THE INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATION 85 (Dennis
[Vol. 52:255
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internal investigation, is not protected 5
The privilege of self-critical analysis has its common law origins
in a 1970 medical malpractice case. In Bredice v. Doctor's Hospital,
26
the court held that minutes and reports of the hospital's staff meetings
were privileged and not subject to discovery by the plaintiff.27 The
court found that the hospital's purpose in holding staff meetings was
to self-evaluate and make recommendations for hospital
improvements." The court found that a free exchange of ideas was
necessary to improve health care for patients, and that confidentiality
was required in order to promote this free exchange.29 The court was
concerned that a doctor might fear making suggestions or
recommendations if there was a possibility that the discussion might
be discoverable in a subsequent malpractice suit.30 The court stated
that doctors' fear of legal liability would inhibit their candor during
hospital self-evaluations, limiting the value of the discussions and
impairing hospitals' abilities to improve patient care.3 ' Accordingly,
the court concluded that because of the strong public interest in
improving the quality of hospital care, the hospital's need for
confidential meetings outweighed the plaintiffs need for discovery.32
The court did note, however, that the privilege was qualified and that
it could be overcome by an evidentiary showing of need by the party
J. Block et al. eds,, 1980).
25. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
26. 50 F.R.D, 249 (D.D.C. 1970), aff-d, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
27. See id. at 249-50.
28 "The value of these discussions and reviews in the education of the doctors who
participate, and the medical students who sit in, is undeniable." Id. at 250.
29 The court stated that "these meetings are essential to the continued improvement in the
care and treatment of patients." Id. at 250. Furthermore, the court noted that "[t]here is an
overwhelming public interest in having those staff meetings held on a confidential basis so that
the flow of ideas and advice can continue unimpeded." Id. at 251.
30. "Constructive professional criticism cannot occur in an atmosphere of apprehension
that one doctor's suggestion will be used as a denunciation of a colleague's conduct in a
malpractice suit." Id. at 250.
31. See 50 F.RD. at 250.
32. "These committee meetings, being retrospective with the purpose of self-
improvement, are entitled to a qualified privilege on the basis of [the] overwhelming public
interest." Id. at 25 1.
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seeking disclosure.33
After Bredice, other courts applied the self-critical analysis
privilege in a variety of business contexts, including employment
discrimination,34 internal police investigations,35 safety procedure
audits,36  securities regulations,37  products liability,38  and
environmental violations.39
Not all courts agree that the privilege applies in each of these
33. See id. Many courts balance the public interest in frank, open discussions against the
individual's evidentiary need. See, e.g., Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 641
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (balancing of plaintiffs need for evidence outweighs defendant's need for
confidentiality); O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D. 211, 217 (D. Mass. 1980) (noting that
balancing may be necessary to weigh the interests of disclosure against the need for confidential
self-evaluation); Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.LD. 431, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(noting that "courts have been sensitive to the need of the plaintiffs for such materials, and have
denied discovery only where the policy favoring exclusion of the materials clearly outweighed
plaintiff's need").
34. Approximately one year after Bredice, the newly formed self-critical analysis privilege
was examined in the employment discrimination context. In Banks v. Lockhead-Georgia Co.,
53 F.R.D. 283, 284 (N.D. Ga. 1971), the plaintiff requested production of documents relating to
Lockheed's internal investigation of equal employment opportunity programs. See id. While not
specifically applying the privilege, the court addressed the public policy reasons to prevent
disclosure of the reports of the internal investigation committee. See id. at 285. Following the
lead of Bredice, the court concluded that the privilege applies to the company's internal reports
evaluating affirmative action programs. See id. Subjecting the written opinions,
recommendations, and conclusions of the internal study to disclosure would discourage
companies from conducting the studies in the first place. See id. Because the self-evaluation
was aimed at improving the company's affirmative action plans, it was in the public's best
interest to encourage this activity by protecting the confidentiality of the investigation. See id.
35. See, e.g., Brown v. Thompson, 430 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1970).
36. See, e.g., Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1992).
The Dowling court held that the privilege did not apply to pre-accident reports. See id. at 427.
The court did not decide whether the privilege applied to post-accident reports. See id. The
court also stated that it was significant that the reviews were performed voluntarily, without the
expectation of confidentiality. See id. at 426-427. But see Granger v. National R.R. Passenger
Corp., 116 F.R.D. 507 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding the self-critical analysis privilege applicable to
protect portions of Amtrak accident investigations due to strong public interest in safe
railroads).
37. See, e.g., In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(holding that an internal report of accounting firm named as a defendant in securities fraud
litigation is protected by the privilege).
38. See, e.g., Bradley v. Melroe Co., 141 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 1992); Roberts v. Carrier
Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co,, 74 F.R.D. 518 (E.D.
Tenn. 1977).
39. See, e.g., Ohio v. CECOS Int'l, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 1118 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Reichold
Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
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contexts. In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC,40 the Supreme
Court refused to expand the self-critical analysis privilege to protect
tenure peer-review files in an employment discrimination case. The
Court did not accept the university's argument that confidential peer
reviews were privileged and refused to apply a balancing test to
weigh the societal need for frank and candid peer reviews against the
plaintiff's evidentiary need for the review file.4' In holding that a
privilege did not exist, the Court considered the history of Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title VII),42 as it applies to educational
institutions .4  Although educational institutions were originally
exempted from Title VII, and the Court reasoned that by eventually
removing the exemption, Congress did not intend a university's
tenure review processes to be privileged."
After University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, courts disagreed on
the application of the self-critical analysis privilege. While most
courts recognize the existence of the privilege, many courts limited
its application, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in University
of Pennsylvania.45 In many cases, courts simply perform a policy
balancing test to determine whether the need for confidentiality
outweighs the other party's need for evidence.46 This discretional
40 493 U.S. 182 (1990). In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, the University denied
tenure to an associate professor. See id. at 185. The professor then filed a complaint with the
EEOC alleging discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and national origin. See id.
41. The University wanted the Commission to "adopt a balancing approach reflecting the
constitutional and societal interest inherent in the peer review process." Id. at 187.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
43. The petitioner argued that universities and colleges, as higher learning institutions,
played an important role in American society and ought to be afforded a higher level of
confidentiality in employment discrimination cases than in the case of an average employer. See
493 U.S. at 189.
44. It should be noted, however, that the Court's narrow analysis focused strictly on Title
VII and educational institutions in disallowing a tenure peer review privilege. "The costs
associated with racial and sexual discrimination in institutions of higher learning are very
substantial." Id. at 193. This holding is only a narrow precedent, and is not a bar on the use of
the privilege in all employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Flynn v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
No. 91 CIV. 0035, 1993 WL 362380 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1993) (upholding the privilege in the
employment discrimination context).
45. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
1997]
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application of the self-critical analysis privilege leaves private
businesses unable to predict with certainty the applicability of the
privilege in various situations."7
B. The Deliberative Process Privilege
The deliberative process privilege48 is the government's version of
private enterprise's self-critical analysis privilege.49 Federal agencies
and departments routinely assert the deliberate process privilege to
protect information regarding internal and external investigations."
This privilege protects the deliberative process of government
officials, including non-factual recommendations, comments, and
opinions, from disclosure.5
Courts first recognized the deliberative process privilege as a
matter of common law. In Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v.
47. Accordingly, a company may be hesistant to conduct voluntary investigations because
if sued there is a strong possibility that the investigations will not be protected. See, e.g., John
C. Conway, Self-Evaluative Privilege and Corporate Compliance Audits, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
621, 658 (1995) (noting that because companies view the privilege as "unreliable" they attempt
to utilize the attorney-client and work-product privileges to protect internal compliance audits).
48. The privilege is also classified under the executive privilege, which is commonly
thought of as applying to officials of the executive branch. See Developments, supra note 5, at
1619-21; but see NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 n.17 (1975)
(differentiating between the deliberative process privilege and the executive privilege). The
executive privilege, however, can also apply to protect military, diplomatic or national secrets.
Many courts treat these secrets as matters of executive concern. See, e.g., United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710-11 (1974). See generally RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A
CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974) (criticizing the executive privilege).
49. "The self-evaluative privilege looks like a private version of the [governmental]
deliberative privilege." John C. Conway, Note, Sel-Evaluative Privilege and Corporate
Compliance Audits, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 634 n.57 (1995). Some seeking protection have
even attempted to claim both privileges. See Mergentime Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan
Area Transp. Auth., No. CIV.A.89-1055, 1991 WL 167005 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 1991).
50. See, e.g., Paisley v. CIA, 712 F.2d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that agency
documents must be deliberative and pre-decisional to be protected by the privilege); American
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 632 F. Supp. 1272, 1277
(D.D.C. 1986) (holding that the department promotion process was privileged); Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Department of Energy, 520 F. Supp. 414 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that a random memo
making recommendations based on agency study is privileged); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 476 F.
Supp. 713 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding that an internal memoranda of commission is protected by
the privilege).
51. See, e.g., KaiserAluminum & Chem. Corp., 157 F. Supp. at 943.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol52/iss1/17
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United States,52 the court held that an internal report produced by the
Government Services Administration containing staff opinions and
recommendations regarding a departmental action was privileged and
protected from discovery. 3 The court noted that written advice from
a variety of individuals is an important element of the government's
decisionmaking process and that the interchange of advice could be
stifled if courts forced the government to disclose those
recommendations.'
After the Kaiser decision, several courts set out guidelines for
applying the deliberative process privilege.5 Application of the
privilege involves a two step analysis: (1) to determine whether the
documents in question are in fact deliberative and (2) to perform a
balancing of the party's interests. 6 The courts held that because the
privilege was qualified, a balancing test weighing the need for
confidentiality against the opposing party's evidentiary need for
disclosure was appropriate. 7 Courts noted that an in camera
52. 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct Cl. 1958).
53. See id. at 942.
54. See id. at 945-46. The court continued further:
Free and open comments on the advantages and disadvantages of a proposed course of
governmental management would be adversely affected if the civil servant or
executive assistant were compelled by publicity to bear the blame for errors or bad
judgment properly chargeable to the responsible individual with power to decide and
act.
Id.
55. See, e.g., Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966)
(holding that protecting decisionmaking and policy-making processes of government officials
was in the public's best interest). The Stiftung court drew an interesting analogy between the
attorney-client and deliberative process privileges:
Freedom of communication vital to fulfillment of the aims of wholesome relationships
is obtained only by removing the specter of compelled disclosure. And while no clear
separation can be made between the United States as a client-litigant and the
Department [of Justice] as its legal representative, government, no less than the citizen,
needs open but protected channels for the kind of plain talk that is essential to the
quality of its functioning.
Id. at 325.
56. See, e.g., Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 854 (3d
Cir. 1995).
57. See Stiftung, 40 F.RD. at 327.
19971
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inspection of the materials could aid in applying the balancing test,
although the requesting party's need must be demonstrable.58 Courts
also recognized the options of partial disclosure or protected
disclosure as possible compromises to the conflicting concerns.59
Congress agreed with the courts and specifically recognized the
privilege in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).6° The FOIA in
essence codified the deliberative process privilege.6 Congress
enacted the FOIA to give the public access to government
information that was previously shielded from public view.62
58. An in camera inspection occurs when "under certain circumstances, a trial judge may
inspect a document which counsel wishes to use at trial in his chambers before ruling on its
admissibility or its use." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 760 (6th ed. 1990). "[l]t may be that the
balance between competing needs for confidentiality and disclosure cannot be made without
analysis of the disputed data. Here the [in camera] inspection enables the weighing to be done
in the privacy of the judge's chambers." Stiftung, 40 F.R.D. at 331-32. The court, however,
noted that for an inspection to be appropriate, there must be a "definite showing of 'facts
indicating reasonable cause for requiring such a submission."' Id. at 331 (quoting Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939,948 (Ct. Cl. 1958)).
59. See id at 332.
60. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994). The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) supports a policy of
open disclosure of information previously kept confidential by government agencies. Congress
also included a list of exemptions in subsection (b). See § 552(b).
61. See5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
62. The Freedom of Information Act "attempts to create a judicially enforceable right to
secure such [official] information from possibly unwilling official hands." EPA v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73, 80 (1973). For example, section 552(a) of the FOIA states:
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows:
(1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register
for the guidance of the public-
(A) descriptions of its central and field organization and the established places
at which, the employees (and in the case of a uniformed service, the members)
from whom, and the methods whereby, the public may obtain information, make
submittals or requests, or obtain decisions;
(B) statements of the general course and method by which its functions are
channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal and
informal procedures available;
(C) rules of procedure, descriptions of forms available or the places at which
forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the scope and contents of all papers,
reports, or examinations;
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law,
and statements of general policy of interpretations of general applicability
formulated and adopted by the agency; and
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.
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Congress did create nine exemptions to the FOIA, however, and
thereby protected certain materials from compelled disclosure.63 One
of the exemptions specifically protects deliberative memorandums
and letters,' 4 but courts have experienced difficulty in interpreting the
statutory provisions."
Eventually, the Supreme Court affirmed that Congress intended to
codify the deliberative process privilege when drafting the
exemptions to the FOIA.' The Court also noted that the deliberative
5 U.S.C. § 552(a).
63. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). For example, national secrets, § 522(b)(1); trade secrets,
§ 552(bX4); personnel and medical files, § 552(b)(6); records for law enforcement purposes,
§ 552(bX7); and geological and geophysical information and data concerning wells,
§ 552(bX9), are all exempted from FOIA.
64. Exemption (5) states that "[finter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters
which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency," do not apply to FOIA. § 552(bX5).
65. For example, the ending clause, "available by law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the agency," § 552(bX5), has forced courts to look back at the rules of discovery
to see whether in requesting a document from the government, that document would be
available to the party in litigation. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 85-86. The problem was
whether Congress intended the common law privilege of deliberative process to be classified as
one of those rules that an agency would have available in litigation with a private individual.
See id. at 86. An examination of some of the legislative history, however, clearly indicates that
Congress had the same concerns with protecting the deliberative processes of the executive
agencies as many of the courts:
[I]t would be impossible to have any frank discussion of legal or policy matters in
writing if all such writings were to be subjected to public scrutiny. It was argued, and
with merit, that efficiency of Government would be greatly hampered if, with respect
to legal and policy matters, all Government agencies were prematurely forced to
.operate in a fishbowl.' The committee is convinced of the merits of this general
proposition ....
S. REP. No. 89-813, at9 (1965).
Interpretive questions caused courts to wonder whether Congress intended to protect the
same deliberative material under the exemption as was protected under the common law
privilege. For example, while the common law deliberative process privilege provided for a
balancing of each litigant's interests, FOIA does not permit inquiry into the particularized needs
of an individual seeking information. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 86. See generally Note, The
Freedom of Information Act and the Exemption for Intra-agency Memoranda, 86 HARv. L.
REV. 1047 (1973) (examining judicial interpretations of Exemption 5).
66. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975). The Court relied on the EPA v.
Mink decision. See id. at 149. In Mink, the Supreme Court clarified the deliberative process
privilege's relationship with exemption (5) of the FOIA and laid down guidelines for applying
the privilege. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 87-89. After comparing the deliberative process
privilege as set forth in Kaiser, and the legislative history of exemption (5), the Court concluded
19971
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process privilege only applied to pre-decisional communications and
not to post-decisional material designed to explain the ultimate
decision.67 The Court's decision solidified the deliberative process
privilege by giving government agencies further guidelines regarding
its application.6
Subsequent cases further defined the scope and application of the
privilege. One court articulated a three-part test to determine whether
a particular document fell within the limits of the privilege: 69 (1)
that Congress had similar policy concerns in mind when it drafted exemption (5). See id. at 86-
87. In effect, exemption (5) was Congress's implicit acceptance of the deliberative process
privilege. See id.
67. Communications are pre-decisional if they were made in attempt to reach a final
conclusion. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 151. Any communications
pertaining to a decision that has already been made are not covered by the privilege. See id. at
152. The court reasoned:
The quality of a particular agency decision will clearly be affected by the
communications received by the decisionmaker on the subject of the decision prior to
the time the decision is made. However, it is difficult to see how the quality of a
decision will be affected by communications with respect to the decision occurring
after the decision is finally reached ... as long as prior communications and the
ingredients of the decisionmaking process are not disclosed.
Sears, 421 U.S. at 151. The court also gave additional policy reasons for only protecting pre-
decisional communications:
The public is only marginally concerned with reasons supporting a policy which an
agency has rejected, or with reasons which might have supplied, but did not supply,
the basis for a policy which was actually adopted on a different ground. In contrast, the
public is vitally concerned with the reasons which did supply the basis for an agency
policy actually adopted.
421 U.S. at 152.
68. The court held that documents prepared by the regional counsel for the NLRB which
directed the dismissal of a complaint were in effect the final disposition of the case and not
"pre-decisional," and therefore not protected by the privilege. See id. at 155.
69. See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
The court also discussed three major purposes of the deliberative process privilege: (I) to assure
that pre-decisional opinions and recommendations will flow freely from subordinates to
decisionmakers, without fear of public ridicule or criticism; (2) to protect prematurely disclosed
policies or opinions before they are officially adopted as agency policy; and (3) to protect from
misleading the public with opinions and recommendations that may have played a minor role in
the policy decision, but were not actually the ultimate deciding factor. See id. at 866. The three
purposes helped the court identify the policy concerns of confidentiality and facilitated
application of the balancing test. See id.
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whether the document is pre-decisional;" (2) whether the document
was made before the adoption of the agency policy it pertained to;7'
and (3) whether the document is "deliberative," reflecting the
exchange of ideas inherent in the formulation of policy. 2 Another
court identified four factors for courts to consider when balancing the
deliberative process privilege against the evidentiary need of the
party seeking disclosure:" (1) the relevance of the evidence to the
lawsuit; (2) the availability of alternative sources for the evidence or
alternative evidence altogether; (3) the government's role in the
litigation; and, most importantly, (4) the extent which disclosure
would harm open and frank communication within the agency.74
Because Congress codified the deliberative process privilege in the
FOIA and courts clearly articulate factors considered in application of
the privilege, government agencies making policy decisions or
conducting investigations that require opinions and recommendations
are able to confidently predict what materials courts will protect from
compelled disclosure.
II. COMPARISON OF THE TREATMENT OF THE PRIVILEGES IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Because application of the self-critical analysis privilege and the
deliberative process privilege is dependent on the context of the
litigation and is often fact-specific, it is important to compare the two
70. The court, however, made an important qualification to the "pre-decisional" criteria:
-[E]ven if the document is pre-decisional at the time it is prepared, it can lose that status if it is
adopted, formally or informally, as the agency position on an issue or is used by the agency in
its dealing with the public." Id.
71. The distinction between the first and second factors is somewhat ambiguous. The
court seems to be concerned with those documents "which would inaccurately reflect or
prematurely disclose the views of the agency, suggesting as agency position that which is as yet
only a personal position." Id. at 866.
72. See id.
73. See FTC v. Warner Communications, 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984).
74. See id. at 1161. Applying the four criteria, the court concluded that although the
evidence in question was relevant, it was available from other sources. See id. at 1161-62.
Because the evidence was otherwise available and the fact that "compelled disclosure of the
memoranda almost certainly injures the quality of agency decisions," the court upheld the
privilege. Id.
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privileges as applied in similar types of cases. For example, a court
might weigh the public's policy interest in environmental regulation
differently than its interest in securities regulation. Employment
discrimination provides an ideal context for comparing the two
privileges because it is an area of law which affects the public and
private sectors equally and because the public policy against biased
treatment in the workplace is the same for government and private
employers.75
A. Self-Critical Analysis Privilege
One of the earliest cases to recognize the self-critical analysis
privilege was in the employment discrimination context.76 The court
weighed the strong policy concerns supporting the privilege and
asserted that allowing compelled disclosure of self-critical material
would hinder compliance with Title VII and affirmative action
plans.77 Several years later, courts began to waver on this view of
self-critical analysis and employment discrimination. Courts began to
weigh plaintiffs' evidentiary need for confidential reports more
heavily than businesses' need for protected self-evaluation.78 One
court established three criteria for application of the privilege in
employment discrimination cases. 79 The court stated that in order to
75. Employment discrimination cases include, but are not limited to violations of Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994); and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). For instance, if an employee believes that he
has been discriminated against in violation of Title VII, he files a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC will then make an investigation for
"reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). If reasonable
cause is found, the EEOC may bring suit or negotiate a settlement with the employer. See id. If
probable cause is not found, the individual may proceed with a lawsuit on his own without the
EEOC. See § 2000e-5(1).
76. See Banks v. Lockhead-Georgia Co., 53 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
77. See id. at 285. The court found that allowing disclosure "would discourage companies
such as Lockheed from making investigations which are calculated to have a positive effect on
equalizing employment opportunities." Id.
78. See, e.g., Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.RD. 431, 432-33 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(holding that the plaintiff's need for equal employer opportunity reports outweighed the
company's need for confidentiality).
79. See id.
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be protected, material had to be prepared for mandatory equal
employment reports required by federal regulation, be non-factual,
subjective material, and that public policy must clearly outweigh the
plaintiffs need for information.' These criteria severely limited the
scope of the self-critical analysis privilege by protecting only
mandatorily prepared documents and insisting that the plaintiffs
need be clearly outweighed by the defendant's interests.81
Some courts no longer recognize the self-critical analysis
privilege in the employment discrimination context.8 2 In Tharp v.
Sivver Steel Corp.," the court held that documents produced under
federal mandate were not protected by the privilege.84 The court gave
little weight to businesses' need for frank and open communications
regarding affirmative action plans or equal employment
compliance.8 5 The court reasoned that because documentation of
these matters was required by federal regulations, such records could
not carry an expectation of confidentiality and disclosure would not
stifle their creation.86
The Tharp court also considered the importance of private civil
80. See id. at 434. The court noted, "[t]he major justification for excluding such material
from discovery is that, in view of the fact that the filing of such reports is mandatory, the policy
favoring equal opportunity in employment requires that employers be encouraged to be candid
and complete in preparing such reports." Id. The court continued, "'The quality of these
documents depends to a great extent on the good faith of employers in evaluating their progress
and establishing affirmative action goals."' Id. (quoting Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp.,
1976 WL 596 (D. Pa. 1976)).
81. See id- This decision began an apparent shift in burden for the policy balancing test.
To assert the privilege, the party seeking disclosure must show that its need clearly outweighs
the policy favoring exclusion of the materials. See id. Cf. Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., 50 F.RD.
249, 251 (D.D.C. 1970) (noting that to overcome the privilege of self-critical analysis, the party
seeking disclosure must show "extraordinary circumstances").
82. See, e.g., Etienne v. Mitre Corp., 146 F.RD. 145 (E.D. Va. 1993); Siskonen v.
Stanadyne, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 610 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114
F.R.D. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Witten v. A.H. Smith & Co., 100 F.R.D. 446 (D. Md. 1984), aff'd
without opinion, 785 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1986).
83. 149 F.1D. 177 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
84. See id. at 178.
85. See id. at 182.
86. *'[D]isclosure in employment discrimination cases will not result in diminished equal
employment evaluations because employers are mandated to file them." Id. at 182. But see
Westinghouse, 81 F.R.D. at 434 (noting that the self-critical analysis privilege ought to be
applied to encourage employers to increase the quality of equal employment evaluations).
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litigation in promoting social change and ending employment
discrimination. 7 The court stated that exercise of the privilege could
prevent a plaintiff with a cognizable claim from accessing relevant
evidentiary material."8 The court reasoned that allowing the privilege
to protect relevant evidence from disclosure would frustrate socially-
beneficial litigation and impede progress toward eradicating
employment discrimination. 9
The Tharp decision did not mark the end of the self-critical
analysis privilege in the context of employment discrimination. A
few courts continue to allow businesses to use the privilege to protect
internal reports regarding equal employment and affirmative action
policies. However, most courts severely limit use of the privilege in
these types of cases.9'
87. See Sivyer Steel, 149 F.R.D. at 183-184.
88. "In the context of employment cases, courts must remain cognizant of the possible
resulting perils when disclosure is prevented of those documents which may yield crucial
evidence regarding an employers' intent and motivation." Id. at 184. See also Wood v. Brier, 54
F.R1D. 7, 10-11 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (stating that plaintiffs should act as "private attorneys
general" in enforcing employment regulations).
89. "Indeed, it is doubtful that the progress made toward equal employment opportunities
in this country over the past 30 years would have been possible without the engine of private
civil litigation driving enforcement of this nations [sic] civil rights laws." Sivyer Steel, 149
F.R.D. at 183. The court concluded that unlike the deliberative process privilege, there had been
no statutory or congressional move to codify the common law privilege. See id. at 184. The
court held that not only did the privilege not apply under the facts of the case, but that no self-
critical analysis privilege existed in the employment discrimination context. See id. at 182.
90. See, e.g., Flynn v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 91 Civ. 0035, 1993 WL 362380
(S.D.N.Y. Sep. 16, 1993). In Flynn the court upheld the use of the privilege in employment
discrimination litigation. See id. The plaintiff brought a gender-discrimination suit against her
employer and sought disclosure of a study conducted by a third party. See id. at *1. The court
applied the policy balancing test and found in favor of the third party and the defendant after an
in camera review of the requested documents. See id. at *3. The court noted that the employee
interviews and the reports contained in the study were prepared with the assumption the
information would be kept confidential. See id. at *2. The court concluded that policy weighed
in favor of non-disclosure because confidentiality was essential in the preparation of the reports,
and disclosure would have a "chilling" effect on the candor of future studies and impair their
value. See id.
91. One of the more recent cases that rejected the privilege is Aramburu v. Boeing Co.,
885 F. Supp. 1434 (D. Kan. 1995). In Aramburu the plaintiff filed discrimination claims based
on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). See id. at 1435. The defendant asserted the self-critical analysis privilege to protect
portions of documents related to its affirmative action plans. See id. at 1435-36. The court based
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B. The Deliberative Process Privilege
Unlike application of the self-critical analysis privilege, judicial
application of the deliberative process privilege in employment
discrimination cases has consistently favored protecting documents
created by the government. These cases arise most frequently when
parties to a private employment discrimination action attempt to
discover documents created by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) during the agency's investigation of the
employer.9" Courts have repeatedly held that the EEOC need not
disclose documents to parties involved in a discrimination lawsuit
concerning the employer investigated by the agency. 3 Courts have
its decision to disallow the privilege in discrimination cases on five reasons. First, the court
attacked the Bredice holding and asserted that the privilege did not have a "historical,
constitutional, or statutory foundation." Id. at 1440. Second, the court chose not to follow the
Banks rationale, disagreeing with the contention that employers would be discouraged from
making investigations into their affirmative action plans if the investigations were later subject
to disclosure. The court believed that where the plans are mandated by law, employers would
have no choice but to comply with the affirmative action requirements. See id. Third, neither
Congress nor the EEOC had made a provision for the privilege in the thirty years since
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act. See id. Fourth, denying the employee access to all
relevant information would limit the strong policy of allowing private actions for violating Title
VII and the ADA in order to deter future discrimination. See id. Finally, the court denied the
privilege in reliance on University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC. See id.
92. Before a plaintiff may file an individual discrimination suit against her employer, she
must file a complaint with the EEOC and wait to receive a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC
before filing her lawsuit. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994). The EEOC generally conducts an
independent investigation before issuing the letter, in order to determine whether the agency
will pursue legal action against the employer. See 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e-5(b), -8.
93. A typical case is Scott v. PPG Industries, Inc., 142 F.RD. 291 (N.D. W. Va. 1992) in
which the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the EEOC charging sex discrimination by the
defendant. See id. at 292. The EEOC conducted an investigation and determined there was
probable cause the employer had violated Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. See id. The EEOC
opted not to file the lawsuit, however, and the plaintiffs filed a private action. See id. The
defendant requested documents created during the probable cause investigation by the EEOC,
and the EEOC asserted the deliberative process privilege. See id. at 292-93.
The court found that the documents requested were indeed deliberative material and
applied the four factor Warner test to decide the issue. See id. While the court found that the
evidence was relevant to the lawsuit and that PPG had no other source for the information, see
id., the court still upheld the privilege and denied disclosure to PPG. In making its
determination, the court held that the policy of protecting open and frank communications
within the agency, tipped the balance in favor of the EEOC. See id. at 294. The court asserted
that subjecting the personal notes and observations to disclosure would inhibit communication
1997]
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found that the policy need for keeping agency investigations
confidential outweighs both plaintiffs' and defendants' needs for
evidence, even when the evidence is relevant and there is no other
source.
94
Even cases not involving EEOC investigations have supported the
deliberative process privilege. For example, one court has held that
the confidentiality of a government agency's hearings officer's notes
taken during a dismissal proceeding was sufficient to invoke the
privilege.9' Because the notes were protected, the employee was
unable to discover them for use in her discrimination suit against the
agency.
9 6
within the agency. See id.
94. In Walker v. NCNB National Bank of Florida, 810 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1993), the
defendant sought production of the notes and comments that formed the basis of the EEOC's
determination letter that there was reasonable cause to find discrimination. See id. at 12. The
court concluded that the deliberative process privilege protected the EEOC documents. See id.
at 14. It found that there was a policy need for the EEOC to keep its investigations confidential
and that this need outweighed the defendant's need for disclosure. See id. Notably, the court
placed the burden of proving the benefits of disclosure outweighed the EEOC's interest in
confidentiality on the party seeking disclosure. See id. On similar reasoning as Scott, the court
noted that a candid investigation was essential for the agency to properly conduct its job. See id.
The court concluded, "the often sensitive nature of allegations of discrimination requires a
certain measure of confidentiality of EEOC investigations so that the agency may effectively
perform its function." See id. at 14 (quoting Report of the Special Master). The court, however,
does not explore the reasons that a lack of confidentiality will inhibit the EEOC's function.
Presumably, even if the deliberative material of reasonable cause investigations were subject to
disclosure, this does not indicate why the EEOC would investigate any less effectively.
95. The deliberative process privilege was upheld in Zinker v. Doty, 637 F. Supp. 138 (D.
Conn. 1986). The plaintiff was contesting her discharge from the Department of Income
Maintenance and sought production of notes taken by a hearing officer of the Department of
Administrative Services during her dismissal hearing. See id. at 139. After an in camera
inspection, the court found that the notes were indeed deliberative and performed the policy
balancing test using similar factors as the court noted in Warner. See id.
The Zinker court decided that the policy factors strongly supported the government's need
for confidentiality. See id. at 141. The court further found that the notes were not particularly
relevant to the plaintiff's case and that there were alternative sources for the information. See id.
The court noted that the factor that tipped the scales in the government's favor was the potential
chilling effect on future noting taking by hearings officers. See id. at 142. The court barred
disclosure because without written notes the officers would not be able to perform their duties.
See id.
96. See id. at 141.
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III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Regardless of whether potentially privileged material was
produced by a private employer's internal investigation or by the
EEOC, the comments, opinions, reports, and other material could be
substantively identical. Comments and conclusions reported by
EEOC investigators could reflect the exact same thought-process and
decisionmaking as internal investigators at a private company.97
Therefore, the differential treatment of the self-critical analysis and
deliberative process privileges should look beyond the substantive
nature of the materials at issue. Instead, courts should explain their
differential treatment by offering policy reasons for giving greater
deference to a government agency's decisionmaking processes, an
arguably public concern, than to private businesses' decisionmaking
processes.98
An important distinction between the application of the two
privileges is that courts have applied the self-critical analysis
privilege only in certain types of cases, while they have not restricted
the application of the deliberative process privilege.' In self-critical
analysis cases, the context of employment discrimination raises a
weighty policy concern: protecting certain documents from discovery
may hinder socially-useful litigation designed to end employment
discrimination. Courts consider this policy when deciding whether or
97. For example, comments, suggestions, and conclusions expressed in the process of
interviewing employees may be substantively similar regardless if the interview was performed
by the EEOC or by the company itself.
98. Ironically, whereas the government has made attempts to open itself up to the people
through the passage of the FOIA, private business remains just that-private. It would seem
logical that as an institution for the people, the government should not be able to protect from
disclosure what a private institution, like a corporation, could not protect.
99. The deliberative process privilege may be asserted by any government agency or
department. It apparently may be applied in any situation where an agency is requested to
produce deliberative documents. See supra Parts I.B, [.B (discussing cases where courts have
applied the deliberative process privilege). See also Vaughan v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1143-44
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (noting that the privilege is available whenever the document in question is
deliberative); Nelson v. Production Credit Ass'n of the Midlands, 131 F.R.D. 161, 164 (D. Neb.
1989) (questioning the applicability of the privilege due to the defendant's uncertain status as a
government agency).
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not to apply the privilege.' However, courts ignore the inherent
public policy issues when applying the deliberative process privilege
in employment discrimination cases.' Instead, courts only focus on
the individual needs of the party seeking disclosure versus the party
seeking protection. 0 2  This discrepancy in treatment becomes
troublesome if important policy concerns are inherent in the context
that the privilege is asserted.'0 3
Another difference between courts' application of the two
privileges is how courts analyze the "chilling" effect of compelled
disclosure. Recent cases applying the self-critical analysis privilege
argued that affirmative action plans and equal employment
opportunity compliance would not be hindered or "chilled" by
forcing disclosure of confidential materials. 14 The courts reasoned
that because government regulations require employers to produce
the reports, employers will continue to do so whether or not they are
privileged. 5 However, courts could apply this same reasoning to
EEOC investigations. Whenever a charge is filed by an aggrieved
100. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
101. In the employment discrimination cases where the deliberative process privilege was
asserted, the policy issue of hindering socially useful litigation was never factored into the
balancing test. See supra Part II.B. For example, the Zinker court did not recognize the policy
concerns of employment discrimination. Unlike the court in Tharp and Arambunr, both self-
critical analysis cases, the Zinker court never addressed the important role of employment
discrimination lawsuits in bringing about social change.
102. In applying the deliberative process privilege, the courts simply perform the qualified
balancing test. See cases cited supra Parts I.B, II.B.
103. Another factor that may play a significantly smaller role in the differential treatment of
the privileges is the identity of the party seeking production. In the self-critical analysis cases
reviewed, for example, the discriminated against employee sought disclosure, and disclosure
was granted. See supra Part II.A. In two of the deliberative process cases, Scott and Walker, the
discriminating company sought disclosure and disclosure was denied. See Scott, 142 F.RtD. 291
(N.D. W. Va. 1992); Walker, 810 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1993). There may be, to some extent, an
undercurrent of sympathy for the employee-plaintiff in each of these cases. Although never
explicitly weighed in the final balancing test, it is apparent that the courts would rather err on
the side of the victim than the alleged discriminator. But see Zinker v. Doty, 637 F. Supp. 138,
141 (D. Conn. 1986) (denying disclosure to employee-plaintiff). Allowing disclosure for a
discrimination victim increases the chances the victim will succeed in litigation. Conversely, if
employers are allowed to protect some damaging piece of evidence, the victim-plaintiff will
find it difficult to prevail.
104. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 86 and accompanying text.
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employee, the EEOC is required by law to investigate discrimination
in the work place.' ° Because EEOC investigations are mandatory,
1 7
the EEOC will continue to produce documents incident to those
investigations whether or not the documents are privileged.1
8
However, courts applying the deliberative process privilege have not
adopted this argument.
Furthermore, courts have interpreted the self-critical analysis
privilege too narrowly by focusing attacks on the privilege as it
pertains to mandatory reports.0 9 The conclusion that businesses will
continue to prepare such reports and documents because they are
required by law is sound."0 However, when courts use that
conclusion to justify rejecting the privilege in all employment
discrimination cases, they discourage employers from initiating
socially desirable, voluntary self-regulation."' In today's litigious
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
107 See ad.
108. Moreover, it seems anomalous for the courts to be concerned with compromising the
EEOC's deliberative process in applying the privilege. The EEOC performs investigations on
the behalf of specific plaintiffs under specific circumstances, and does not make general policy
rulings. As well, the EEOC, as an independent party, has no fear of either frivolous litigation or
legal retribution by any of the parties involved. As noted by the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., one of the policy justifications for the deliberative process privilege was
to prevent public confusion. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. But an EEOC
investigation will not cause public confusion because only after the EEOC's investigation is
completed and reasonable cause determination has been made, does the possibility of litigation
arise. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. Therefore, by the time the EEOC or the
plaintiff ends up in court with the employer, the EEOC investigation is necessarily post-
decisional and does not fall under the Sears rationale.
109. See Sivyer Steel, 149 F.R.D. at 182 ("[It must first be noted that affirmative action
plans . are not voluntary, but mandated by law."); Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 885 F. Supp.
1434, 1439 (D. Kan. 1995) ("[E]mployers are generally likely to comply with legal
requirements and will prepare affirmative action plans.").
110. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.LD. 211, 217 (D. Mass. 1980). In that
case the court noted that subjecting conclusions contained in affirmative action plans to
discovery would not necessarily deter future self-evaluations because "the evaluations ... were
not entirely voluntary, they will occur even if the threat of discovery is present." Id. However,
the court's first criteria for applying the privilege was whether the material was prepared for
mandatory governmental reports. See id. This seems to be a form of rationale bootstrapping to
limit the application of the privilege.
11 I. See, e.g., Mazzella v. RCA Global Communications, Inc., No. 83 CIV. 3716, 1984
WL 55541, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. March 28, 1984) ("In furtherance of voluntary compliance,
employers must be encouraged to be candid and forthright in assessing their employment
Washington University Open Scholarship
276 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 52:255
society, courts should encourage private institutions to seek alternate
methods of settling disputes," 2 and voluntary investigations are both
preventative and remedial." 3
Another policy distortion articulated by courts applying the self-
critical analysis privilege asserts that application of the privilege will
limit socially-useful litigation intended to eradicate employment
discrimination. 4 Those courts contend that plaintiffs will be less able
to prove intentional discrimination at trial if they are not allowed to
discover self-evaluative reports and documents." 5 However, this
analysis fails to recognize that Congress and the courts have reduced
plaintiffs' evidentiary burden in employment discrimination cases.
For example, congressional adoption of the "disparate impact" theory
of discrimination allows a plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination
with only statistical evidence." 6 Because the evidentiary burden on
the plaintiff is lessened, many subjective self-evaluative documents
practices and setting goals and timetables for eradicating policies deemed to be discriminatory
in operation or effect."). See generally Michael P. Kenny & William R. Mitchelson, Jr.,
Corporate Benefits of Properly Conducted Internal Investigations, I 1 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 657,
661 (1995) (noting the advantages of corporate internal investigations); Conway, supra note 47,
at 629 (noting that confidentiality may encourage corporate legal compliance).
Typically, when discrimination occurs, the employer is often complained to first, and thus
is in the best position to correct the problem quickly and efficiently.
112. Recently there has been a growing trend in favor of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) which has partially lifted the burden off of inundated courts. See generally I
LAWRENCE DESSEM, PRETRIAL LITIGATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE ch. 15 (2d ed. 1996)
(discussing different forms of ADR and the policies for promoting them).
113. See generally DAN K. WEBB ET AL., CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS § 11.08
(1995); BRAD D. BRIAN & BARRY F. MCNEIL, INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS:
CONDUCTING THEM PROTECTING THEM (1992); Kenny & Mitchelson, supra note 11, at 661.
114. See, e.g., Sivyer Steel, 149 F.R.D. at 83.
115. See id. at 182; Aramburu, 885 F. Supp. at 1440.
116. Disparate impact, recognized in Title VII cases, requires no showing of motive. A
plaintiff must only show that he or she was a member of a protected class that was
disproportionately adversely affected by the employer's actions. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971) (recognizing the theory of disparate impact). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k) (1994) (codification of disparate impact). Section 2(k)(B)(i) of Title VII states in part, "the
complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice
causes a disparate impact." Normally, statistical information will suffice to show the protected
class was substantially disproportionately impacted. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (approving the
use of statistics to prove disparate impact). Statistical information is objective, and thus is not
protected by the self-critical analysis privilege.
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prepared by the employer may not be necessary to prove the
plaintiff's case. Therefore, a privilege protecting self-evaluative
documents may not have a large impact on the outcome of some
employment discrimination litigation." 7
Another discrepancy in the application of the two privileges is
who possesses the burden of proof in the policy interest balancing
test. In many self-critical analysis cases, courts place the burden of
proof on the party asserting the privilege to show that disclosure
would chill future self-evaluations." 8 On the other hand, in many
deliberative process privilege cases, courts place the burden on the
party seeking disclosure to show that their need for the evidence
outweighs the government's need to keep the deliberations
confidential." 9 In fact, very few deliberative process privilege cases
117. Another reason employment discrimination litigation will not be stifled is that the
privilege is qualified. In all applications of the privilege, the policy concerns of keeping candid
investigations confidential must be weighed against the plaintiff's need for discovery. In
instances where the plaintiff is entirely without evidence to prove his case, the court can easily
perform a balancing test via in camera inspection of the requested documents. In cases where
the defendant is attempting to protect a document crucial to the plaintiff's success, the policy
concerns will fall on the side of disallowing the privilege. The application of the privilege will
not inhibit employment discrimination litigation once commenced, but it may curtail it in favor
of dispute resolving internal investigations performed by employers. Encouraging the self-
policing function will further the social goals of Title VII and other employment discrimination
acts, without burdening the courts with excess litigation.
118. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (noting the Webb court's placement of
burden in the balancing test). This burden has changed over time. Originally, the party seeking
production had to show "extraordinary circumstances" to overcome the opponent's need for
confidentiality. Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 251. See also Flynn v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 91
CIV. 0035, 1993 WL 362380, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1993) (noting that plaintiff must make
a "compelling showing" of need to overcome the privilege). Due to more recent decisions like
Aramburu, it is doubtful that Flynn indicates a permanent shift in the burden of proof back to
the party opposing the privilege.
119. See. e.g., Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army of the United States,
55 F.3d 827, 854 (3d Cir. 1995) ("The party seeking discovery bears the burden of showing that
its need for the documents outweighs the government's interest."); FTC v. Warner
Communications, 742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984) ("A litigant may obtain deliberative
materials if his or her need for the materials and the need for accurate fact finding override the
government's interest in non-disclosure."). Walker v. NCNB Nat'l Bank of Florida, 810 F.
Supp. at 13 ("In order to overcome the privilege, the party seeking disclosure must show that
the interests in disclosure outweigh the interests in non-disclosure."); Scott v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
142 F.R.D. at 294 ("PPG has failed to demonstrate sufficient need .. "); Zinker v. Doty, 637 F.
Supp. at 141 (noting the plaintiff failed to show lack of an alternative source for the evidence);
1997l
Washington University Open Scholarship
278 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 52:255




In the absence of legislative enactment, the courts should make a
concerted effort to clarify the self-critical analysis privilege.'2' As
with any rule of law, the easier it is for parties to predict how a
privilege applies, the more likely it is those parties will be able to
comply with the law, and less likely that discovery disputes will
arise. Because the self-critical analysis privilege is qualified, subject
to a policy interest balancing test, the privilege should potentially be
applicable in any context. Courts would then have the freedom to
weigh competing concerns on a case-by-case basis. As a result,
private enterprise would be encouraged to self-regulate through
internal investigations. Courts must be careful to only apply the
privilege in cases where the threat of disclosure may hinder the
creation or execution of voluntary internal investigations.122 Courts
should define specific guidelines similar to those proposed in
deliberative process cases. Courts should also utilize in camera
inspections in cases where there is a question as to the nature of the
documents for which the privilege is sought.
Futhermore, courts should take special care to hold the two
privileges to similar standards. An analysis of policy concerns
dictates that both privileges should be applied consistently and
cf Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("It is
also clear that the agency has the burden of establishing what deliberativeprocess is involved..
.") (emphasis added).
120. See supra Parts LB, II.B. The cases that disallowed the deliberative process privilege
did so on the basis that the documents in question where either not "deliberative" or were not
pre-decisional. See Sears, 421 U.S. at 153-54; Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 868. Even when the
courts have found that the party seeking disclosure has demonstrated substantial need, they
have upheld the deliberative process privilege. See, e.g., Scott, 142 F.RLD. at 294 ("There is no
indication that PPG can obtain evidence equivalent to that sought.., from any other source.").
121. For example, the courts should make an effort to place the burden of proof required in
the policy interest balancing test on the same party in each instance, and set a uniform standard.
122. The policy that disclosure would deter socially beneficial regulation does not apply for
mandatory investigations. See supra notes 86-89 accompanying text (discussing the
mandatory/voluntary distinction).
123. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing the Warner guidelines).
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uniformly. The policy reasons supporting the application of the
privileges are nearly identical. Self-monitoring and self-regulation are
socially valuable activities that courts should encourage. 2 4 Courts
should encourage private enterprise to engage in self-regulating
activity by granting businesses the same freedom of candor as
government agencies. Just as courts presently protect the thought
processes of government officials from the "chilling" effect of
disclosure, so should courts protect private businesses that conduct
internal investigations or audits. The objective of self-improvement
and regulation is socially desirable, and can only be fostered when
companies can adequately protect open and frank recommendations
and opinions created during self-investigations."z
In the employment discrimination context, the need for similar
standards is clear. The EEOC investigations protected in many cases
may contain similar material as a defendant company's investigative
reports in the self-critical analysis cases. Important steps towards the
eradication of the employment discrimination are made by litigation,
but companies should be given the incentive to remedy the situations
themselves before courts force them to disclose confidential
documents regarding internal investigations." 6  If internal
investigations of discrimination claims are chilled by the threat of
disclosure, society will lose an important tool instrumental to the
objective of ending employment discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Upon close examination, both the self-critical analysis privilege
124. Some of the advantages of corporate internal investigations are: (1) assessment of
internal controls and loss prevention measures; (2) identification of areas where additional
corporate policies or measures may avoid future loss or civil or criminal exposure; and (3)
avoidance of formal legal proceedings and expenses pursuant to an informal demand by a
potential private litigant. See Kenny & Mitchelson, supra note 111, at 661.
125. There has been growing support for legislative enactment of a self-critical analysis
privilege. See, e.g., Karen Donovan, Fears of Liability Spawn New Focus on Audit Privilege,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 27, 1992, at 19; Daniel L. Goelzer & Clifford E. Kirsch, Penalizing
Companies for Fighting Crime, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1992, at 13.
126. See generally Kenny & Mitchelson, supra note 111, at 661.
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and the deliberative process privilege are supported by the policy
concerns of promoting self-monitoring and self-regulation. The
differential treatment of the two privileges may simply boil down to
an institutional bias in favor of the government. While this bias for
holding governmental matters in greater regard than private concerns
may be justifiable in many respects, it is questionable in the instance
of deliberative matters. As noted by the passage of the Freedom of
Information Act and similar legislation, there is an on-going public
concern for an open government that is accessible to the people. In
light of this desire for openness, it is important to re-evaluate the bias
for government in the application of the self-critical analysis and
deliberative process privileges and consider a more uniform standard
of application for both. Clearly, a uniform and consistent application
of the privileges makes policy sense, and would allow private
enterprise some of the deference that has previously favored the
government. In turn, these companies would be encouraged to
conduct socially beneficial self-regulation.
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